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ABSTRACT 
War Casualties and US Presidential Popularity:  
A Comparison of the Korean, Vietnam and Iraq War    
by Benny Geys  
Conventional wisdom holds that war casualties depress incumbent popularity. 
We argue that the strength and even the direction of these effects is inherently 
context-dependent because the perception of casualties varies over time and 
space, affected by historical developments. While intuitive, this proposition has 
as yet not been directly addressed due to a lack of explicitly comparative 
analyses. Investigating US presidential popularity over the period 1948-2006, 
the present paper illustrates that intensity and occurrence of casualty effects on 
presidential popularity varies significantly across the three considered military 
conflicts (i.e. Korea, Vietnam, Iraq). Moreover, these differences can be credibly 
linked to historical developments. 
 
Keywords: Presidential approval, popularity function, war, casualties, historical 
institutionalism 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Kriegsopfer und die Popularität der US-Präsidenten: 
Ein Vergleich der Kriegskonflikte in Korea, Vietnam und im Irak  
Nach gängiger Meinung verringern Kriegsopfer die Beliebtheit des Amts-
inhabers. Wir behaupten, dass die Stärke und sogar die Richtung dieser Effekte 
an sich kontextabhängig ist, denn Kriegsschäden und -opfer werden über die 
Zeit und den Raum hinweg unterschiedlich wahrgenommen und ist beeinflusst 
durch geschichtliche Entwicklungen. Obwohl diese Aussage intuitiv ist, wurde 
sie bisher noch nicht direkt thematisiert, da es an explizit vergleichenden 
Analysen mangelte. Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht die Popularität der US-
Präsidenten über den Zeitraum 1948 bis 2006 und zeigt, dass die Intensität und 
Häufigkeit der Auswirkungen von Opfer fordernden Zwischenfällen auf die 
Beliebtheit des Präsidenten signifikant zwischen den drei betrachteten militäri-
schen Konflikten (d.h. Korea, Vietnam, Irak) variiert.  Zudem können solche 
Unterschiede glaubwürdig mit geschichtlichen Entwicklungen in Verbindung 
gebracht werden. 
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1.  Introduction 
While scholars generally agree that “casualties ultimately drag down [political leaders’] job 
approval” (Eichenberg et al., 2006, 802; see also Mueller, 1973; Kernell, 1978; Schwartz, 
1994; Gronke and Newman, 2003; Eichenberg et al., 2006; Kriner, 2006; Karol and Miguel, 
2007; Gartner, 2008), public opinion is unlikely to respond in similar fashion to each war, nor 
is it likely to follow the same pattern during every conflict. The reason is that timing and 
sequence of events are of crucial importance in political and social processes (e.g., Thelen, 
1999; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000a). Inasmuch as each war (or conflict) has its own 
particularities, develops within a given political and societal setting and against its historical 
background, the effects casualties have on public opinion are likely to be – much like 
preference formation more generally – “emergent from the situation (endogenous) and 
context-specific” (Scott, 2001, 36).  
 
This argument – which builds on insights from historical institutionalism (Thelen and 
Steinmo, 1992; Thelen, 2004) – can be seen as leading up to a very basic proposition: namely, 
context matters. Yet, despite its intuitive appeal, this supposition has received surprisingly 
little attention in the casualties-and-popularity literature. This is not to say that scholars 
assume that the effect of casualties should be the same across all conflicts.1 However, most 
scholars concentrate on one particular conflict. While this allows a detailed analysis of that 
conflict’s specific setting, comparisons across conflicts and study of potential differences 
across conflicts are then by definition impossible. 
 
The present paper addresses the latter question by explicitly diverging from the customary 
‘one study, one war’ approach. Specifically, we compare the effect of casualties on US 
presidential popularity in the three main US-fought wars since World War II (i.e. Korea, 
Vietnam and Iraq).2 As such, we extend previous scholarship in three main ways. First, to the 
best of our knowledge, no study thus far compared the casualty-popularity relation for more 
than two wars within the same analysis. Second, we account simultaneously for the influence 
of casualties, the ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect and (potential) changes in presidency during 
the conflict. While each of these issues has attracted extensive attention on its own, a 
combined analysis of all three elements has thus far been lacking. Third, we assess whether 
the ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect reduces casualty sensitivity at the onset of a conflict (rather 
than directly affecting popularity).  
 
Our results allow three main conclusions. First, while casualties are bad for popularity in all 
three conflicts, this held most strongly during the Vietnam War. Also, the effect of casualties 
in Korea and Iraq is statistically indistinguishable (even though human losses in Korea were 
                                                          
1  Indeed, there has been some research concerning the potential determinants of casualty sensitivity. In fact, it 
has been associated with demographic developments (Luttwak, 1995), technological change (Sapolsky and 
Shapiro, 1996), perceptions of success (Gelpi et al., 2006) and framing of casualty numbers (Boettcher and 
Cobb, 2006). Likewise, public support for the use of military force has been related to, among other things, 
the aim of the conflict (Jentleson, 1992; Jentleson and Britton, 1998), perceptions of success (Eichenberg, 
2005; Larson, 1995), domestic political and media support (Baker and Oneal, 2001; Colaresi, 2007; 
Berinsky, 2007), outside support (Chapman and Reiter, 2008) and elite consensus/dissensus (Larson, 1995). 
For recent review, see Aldrich et al. (2006, 481-483). 
2  These are studied most extensively in the literature (allowing some benchmarking of our findings) and are 
arguably also the most ‘important’ wars in recent US history (see Nordhaus, 2002). We do not explicitly 
analyse US involvement in the first Persian Gulf War as its briefness does not allow us to adequately account 
for it in the present analysis. We also disregard US involvement in peacekeeping missions in, say, Somalia, 
Kosovo and Lebanon as these are often regarded differently by the public (Larson, 1996; Burk, 1999; Gronke 
and Newman, 2003). 
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much higher). The latter points to higher casualty-aversion in the current conflict, which may, 
for example, derive from a post-Vietnam trauma or technological advances in warfare (which 
might make human sacrifice less acceptable). Second, a strong rally reducing casualty 
sensitivity early in the conflict appears to only exist for the Korean War, but not for Vietnam 
or Iraq. For Iraq, the effect all but disappears when accounting for the president’s (pre-
emptive) ‘war is over’ message. For Vietnam, the reason is likely to be that there was no clear 
beginning of the conflict (more details below). Finally, the change in presidency during the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars generated different effects. Eisenhower was not affected by 
casualties in the ongoing conflict after taking over the presidency, while Nixon was. This 
suggests that insulation from a ‘casualty-penalty’ only occurs when the conflict is resolved 
quickly after power is transferred. Overall, differences in the precise effects of casualties on 
public opinion emerge from the situation (cf. Scott, 2001). Taking context, timing and 
sequence of events into account thus appears essential for accurate inferencing across 
conflicts (Pierson, 2000a, b). 
 
The next section briefly reviews the preceding literature and discusses the (potential) 
importance of contextual and comparative research. Then, in section 3, we present an analysis 
of US presidential popularity ratings over the period 1948-2006 to illustrate how comparisons 
across conflicts (and use of the particular circumstances and characteristics of each war) can 
add to our knowledge on the casualty-popularity relation. Section 4 concludes and discusses 
our main findings. 
 
2.  Literature and hypothesis 
2.1. Three ‘stylised facts’ 
Extensive empirical research on the relation between war casualties and incumbent popularity 
has led to three ‘stylised facts’. First, the human cost of military conflicts – in terms of 
casualties suffered – often significantly undermines incumbent popularity. This holds for the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars (e.g., Mueller, 1973; Kernell, 1978; Sigelman and Conover, 1981; 
Ostrom and Simon, 1985; Schwartz, 1994; Gartner and Segura, 1998, 2000) as well as World 
War II (e.g., Baum and Kernell, 2001; Kriner, 2006) and the current Iraq campaign (e.g., 
Eichenberg et al., 2006; Voeten and Brewer, 2006; Kriner, 2006; Karol and Miguel, 2007; 
Gartner, 2008). The first US-fought Persian Gulf War appears to be an exception, though this 
has been argued to derive from its shortness (e.g., Mueller, 1994). 
 
Second, the onset of a war is often characterised by a ‘rally around the flag’-effect. This 
occurs when the population – following cues from political elites or the media – gathers 
behind its leader in times of significant turmoil (Mueller, 1973; Sigelman and Conover, 1981; 
Brody, 1991; Colaresi, 2007). The argument builds on the well-known principle that internal 
cohesion is often increased when there is a threat from outside (e.g., Abrams et al., 2005; 
Münster, 2007). While such surges in public support are not certain to materialize (cf. Lai and 
Reiter, 2005, and references therein), they have been documented for the Persian Gulf War 
(e.g., Krosnick and Brannon, 1993; Lai and Reiter, 2005), the Falklands War (Lai and Reiter, 
2005) and the current Iraq War (e.g., Eichenberg et al., 2006).3  
 
Third, the effect of war casualties is especially strong for political leaders who started a war or 
conflict, compared to those who merely inherit it (Ostrom and Simon, 1985; Marra et al., 
1990; Gartner and Segura, 1998). The reason is that those starting the conflict are most clearly 
                                                          
3  Importantly, however, these studies illustrate that there is an increase in leaders’ popularity at the onset of 
conflict, not that this reduces the sensitivity to casualties at this time (which will be regarded below). 
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‘responsible’ and accountable for its consequences – and casualties. Those who inherit an 
ongoing war are often elected on the promise either to stop the war, or to handle it differently. 
Moreover, they cannot be held accountable for the country’s initial involvement in the war 
and the state of the conflict. 
 
2.2.  Theoretical background 
Although these three features surface during various conflicts and in different countries, 
scholars have thus far neglected comparative analyses to assess to what extent, how and why, 
these effects differ over time and space. Hence, while casual observation of previous ‘single-
war’ studies confirms significant variation in these effects over time, little is as yet known 
about what might explain such differences.  
 
To address the latter question, we rely on insights from neo-institutionalist theories and, more 
specifically, historical institutionalism. Institutions are in this theoretical approach defined as 
both formal and informal “organizational arrangements infused with values beyond their 
instrumental utility” (Olsen, 2005, 4). Clearly, the perception of human losses in military 
conflicts can be viewed as one such institution, as part of the set of “informal rules (…) that 
structure conduct” (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, 2; see also Swidler, 1986; Scott, 2001). That 
is, what it means to observe a given casualty count – and therefore how it translates in public 
opinion and retribution of political leaders – depends on how such an event is regarded (or 
constructed) in a society at a given point in time. Individuals’ actions – in this case, 
withdrawing support from political leaders – “cannot be understood except as part of [this] 
larger institutional framework” (Krasner, 1998, 72).  
 
Crucially, institutions do not exist in isolation, but “emerge from and are embedded in 
concrete temporal processes” (Thelen, 1999, 369). Hence, social norms and values, regarded 
as informal institutions (cf. supra), are not always and everywhere the same, nor are they 
necessarily understood in similar ways in different places. Rather, they are continuously 
affected by political and societal events (Thelen, 2004). As such, historical developments 
decisively shape how casualties are regarded over time and how strongly they will shape 
public opinion towards its leaders (at each point in time).  
 
Applied to the present setting, this line of reasoning implies that the perception of human 
losses in military conflicts – and the resulting casualty sensitivity in the population – changes 
over time. This idea is (implicitly) reflected in, for example, the belief among many observers 
that the sheer number of casualties the US suffered in the Vietnam War induced a trauma in 
the minds of the US population, which led them to become extremely sensitive to military 
interventions (and casualties therein) (e.g., Sapolsky and Shapiro, 1996; Feaver and Gelpi, 
2004; Boettcher and Cobb, 2006). It also surfaces in the proposition that technological 
advances in warfare may have led to increased casualty sensitivity among the US population 
by generating an unwarranted belief in the superfluous nature of human losses in modern 
military engagements (e.g., Sapolsky and Shapiro, 1996). 
 
In the empirical analysis below, we address the resulting hypothesis that the size (and, 
possibly, direction) of casualty effects on political leaders’ popularity depends on the context 
and characteristics of the conflict. We thereby mainly assess to what extent this relation 
differs over time (and conflicts) – such that the analysis presented here is mostly of a 
descriptive nature. While we also suggest potential explanations for the differences we 
observe (on a rather ad hoc basis, much like Lai and Reiter, 2005), determining the exact 
nature and applicability of these “scope conditions” (cf. Lakatos, 1981; Elster, 1989) goes 
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beyond the aim of the present analysis. Nonetheless, we believe that the descriptive, 
comparative analysis presented here provides a useful and necessary first step to investigate 
the scope conditions under which the three mentioned ‘stylised facts’ emerge.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
3.1.  Empirical specification 
To assess how context shapes the casualty-popularity relationship, we present a comparative 
analysis of US presidential approval ratings across three conflicts (i.e. Korea, Vietnam, Iraq) 
over the 1948-2006 period. Hence, rather than test for the mere presence/absence of casualty 
effects or variation in casualty sensitivity across individuals in a given conflict – as in most 
previous work – we address whether, and to what extent, these effects differ across conflicts.4 
This approach is comparable to Lai and Reiter’s (2005) comparative analysis of the rally-
around-the-flag effect in different conflicts involving the UK. Specifically, our basic 
specification is:5 
 
Pt =  a + b1 Pt-1 + b2 Xt + b3 Casualtiest + b4 Casualtiest * WarStartt  
+ b5 Casualtiest * NewAdmint + et 
The dependent variable measures US presidential popularity (Pt) using the share of the 
population expressing approval on the standard Gallup approval question: “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the way President [name] has handled his job as a president?”. We take an 
average value when more polls are available for a given quarter and linearly interpolate for 
quarters lacking a poll by Gallup. The data range from a low of 23% to a high just over 87% 
with a mean value of 54% (summary statistics for all variables are presented in appendix A).  
 
As explanatory variables, the model first of all includes one lag of the dependent variable (Pt-
1) to capture slow intertemporal adjustment in popularity ratings (e.g., Kernell, 1978; Geys 
and Vermeir, 2008a, b). Then, represented above as a vector of control variables (Xt), we 
include a number of (standard) economic variables: namely, real growth rate of GDP, 
inflation rate and unemployment rate (all in the current quarter). As political controls, we 
include administration dummies, a ‘honeymoon’ variable (cf. Smyth and Dua, 1989; Fox and 
Phillips, 2003)6 and an indicator variable capturing ‘pre-election rebounds’ (see, e.g., 
Goodhardt and Bhansali, 1970; Cusack, 1999; Schmitt and Wüst, 2006).7 Lower 
accountability of divided governments (cf. Powell and Whitten, 1993; Nicholson et al., 2002) 
is assessed by including a dummy variable equal to 1 when the president’s party does not 
control the House or Senate, 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for events such as the Iran-
                                                          
4  Similarly, one could ask whether the effect of war casualties shows similar patterns for a given war across the 
various countries involved (e.g., US versus UK in the current Iraq conflict). Unfortunately, at present, we 
lack the data to explore this issue. 
5  We rely on quarterly data to estimate the model. Clearly, it would be preferable to have a higher frequency of 
observations to more accurately assess the temporal aspects of the model. However, due to constraints 
imposed by the economic control variables, this is not possible. 
6  This accounts for the ebb and flow of presidential terms. It is 3 in the second quarter of each administration, 
2 in the third quarter, 1 in the fourth quarter and 0 in all other quarters. Note that the first quarter of each 
administration is dropped from the sample since there is no lagged dependent variable for this observation. 
7  This variable is 1 only in the quarter of the election. Using a pre-election variable equal to 1 in quarters 3 and 
4 of the election year – or in the entire election year – does not affect our main results, but gives weaker 
results for the pre-election variable (suggesting rebound mostly occurs in the election quarter).  
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hostage affair8, the Persian Gulf War (dummy equal to 1 in 1991:1), the 9/11 attacks (dummy 
equal to 1 in 2001:4)9, the Watergate scandal (dummy equal to 1 in the quarters 1973:2-
1974:2), the Iran-Contra affair (dummy equal to 1 in the quarters 1986:4-1987:1) and 
President Clinton’s Monica Lewinsky affair (dummy equal to 1 in 1998:1-1999:1). 
 
Central to the analysis are three variables related to the political cost of war casualties. The 
first, ‘Casualties’, is a vector of three variables (i.e. one for each conflict) measuring the 
natural log of the number of casualties suffered by the US army in a given quarter in a given 
conflict.  It has non-zero values between 1950:2 and 1954:4 for the Korean War, 1962:1 and 
1975:4 for Vietnam and 2003:1 and 2006:3 (the most recent observation in our sample) for 
the Iraq war. Using separate casualty counts for each war allows us to assess whether 
casualties as such are equally detrimental to popularity in each conflict. Importantly, the 
natural logarithms not only permit interpreting the coefficients as semi-elasticities, but also 
make the regression coefficients comparable across the three wars.10 
 
Building on the extensive ‘rally-around-the-flag’-effect literature (e.g., Krosnick and 
Brannon, 1993; Eichenberg et al., 2006), one could argue that the early stages of a war may 
witness a lower casualty sensitivity compared to the rest of the conflict. One potential reason 
for ignoring or downplaying casualty counts at the onset of a conflict is that this reduces the 
psychologically uncomfortable dissonance between supporting the president and the human 
costs associated with the conflict (cf. the cognitive dissonance-literature within psychology; 
see Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999). To capture this, we interact the logged 
number of casualties in each war with an indicator variable (‘WarStart’) equal to one for the 
first two quarters of the war (0 otherwise): i.e. Korea, 1950:3-4; Vietnam, 1964:3-4; Iraq, 
2003:1-2.11 As this two-quarter period is admittedly arbitrary, we re-estimate the model 
defining the first and first three quarters of the war as ‘early stage’. Introducing both the level 
of casualties and the interaction term empirically distinguishes between the effect of war 
casualties in the first two quarters of the war (b3 + b4) and their overall effect in the war (b3). 
Once again, by estimating these effects for the three wars separately, we can asses to which 
extent the early stages of the three wars are ‘different’ (in terms of translating war casualties 
into incumbent’s approval ratings). 
 
                                                          
8  This variable is 1/i (with i = 1,…,5) in quarters between 1979:4 and 1981:4, and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, 
one might model an exponential decline (i.e. te−  with t = 0, 1,…,4 between 1979:4 and 1981:4) as suggested 
by Ostrom and Simon (1989) and Marra et al. (1990). This alternative specification does not affect our 
findings. 
9  Some scholars argue that the 9/11 attacks had a strong and slowly decaying effect on presidential approval 
(e.g., Gaines, 2002; Hetherington and Nelson, 2003). Yet, Eichenberg and Stoll (2006) estimate the duration 
of the event at 15 weeks using news coverage data from the New York Times. This substantiates our choice 
to include an indicator variable for one quarter only rather than model a (linearly or exponentially) declining 
impact. Note also that a more explicit modelling of the possibly declining impact of 9/11 introduces 
multicollinearity with the Iraq War casualty variable – inducing severe identification problems. 
10  We follow Gartner and Segura (1998; 2000) in using marginal (in our case quarterly) casualty counts rather 
than cumulative casualties (as in, e.g., Mueller, 1973; Ostrom and Simon, 1985). The reason is that the 
marginal measure acknowledges the importance of turning points and views temporally proximate human 
costs as crucial in the determination of public opinion (Gartner and Segura, 1998). Moreover, the cumulative 
measure is strongly correlated with time and thus confounds the pure effect of casualties with that of other 
time-dependent elements such as war weariness (Gartner and Segura, 1998, 2000). The marginal casualty 
measure does not suffer from this identification problem. 
11  None of these wars had an official declaration of war. Hence, for the Korean and Iraq War, we use the 
beginning of major US military activity as the official starting point (in July 1950 and March 2003 
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An ‘inherited’ rather than ‘initiated’ war has been argued to weaken casualties’ effect on the 
incumbent president’s popularity (cf. Ostrom and Simon, 1985; Marra et al., 1990; Gartner 
and Segura, 1998). This is picked up by interacting the casualty count for each war with a 
dummy variable (‘NewAdmin’) indicating a change in presidential administration (equal to 1 
from 1953:1 to the end of the Korean War and from 1969:1 to the end of the Vietnam War). 
To the extent that the political price of war casualties is lower when a president inherits rather 
than starts a war, b5 should be positive (whereby b3 + b5 indicates the effect of casualties on 
the new administration). Inasmuch as it differs across conflicts, b5 should also be statistically 
different for the Vietnam and Korean War. 
 
3.2. Results 
As a first stage in the analysis, unit root tests were performed to assess the stationarity of our 
variables.12 Their results (given in Table 1) indicate that all variables are stationary, with the 
exception of inflation. As first differences of this variable are stationary, we include it in first-
differenced form in our model. The results from the estimations themselves are brought 
together in Table 2. The sole difference between the results in the three columns of Table 2 is 
the definition of the ‘early stage’ of the conflict. In Column (1), only the first quarter is 
defined as the ‘start’ of the war, whereas this is extended to the first two or three quarters in 
Columns (2) and (3) respectively.   
__________________ 
Table 1 and 2 about here 
__________________ 
Before discussing the main findings, it is clear that our control variables support previous 
findings. All three economic control variables – growth, unemployment and inflation – have 
the expected sign and are statistically significant at conventional levels (except for inflation). 
Regarding the political variables, we find clear evidence of president-specific effects, a 
‘honeymoon’ effect as well as a pre-election rebound. Fragmentation of power (i.e. divided 
government) appears to insulate the president from (at best) part of the cost of ruling. 
Scandals such as Watergate and the Iran-Contra affair had a devastating impact on 
presidential popularity, while this is not the case for the Lewinsky affair (the latter is in line 
with Zaller, 1998). Both 9/11 and the Iran-hostage affair boosted approval ratings (although 
support for President Carter withered quickly due to various failed attempts to resolve the 
hostage situation). The quick and successful resolution of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 also 
greatly benefited the popularity of the incumbent US president. 
 
Turning to the central casualty variables, it is clear that the effect of war casualties on US 
presidential approval ratings differs significantly across the three wars considered.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
respectively). For the Vietnam War, we use the declaration of Tonkin in August 1964 when the US Congress 
officially authorized military intervention (see also Oneal and Brian, 1995; Baker and Oneal, 2001). 
12  We perform augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. The number of included lagged first differences was decided by 
a sequential general to specific rule (Hall, 1994; Maddala and Kim, 2004) – taking the integer part of [12 
(T/100)1/4] (with T representing the number of observations) as the starting point (see Schwert, 1989). 
Consequently, we use 14 lags as the point of departure (as T=223). Inclusion of a trend variable and constant 
term was based on statistical significance of these variables. The reason is that including too many such 
‘deterministic’ variables reduces the power of the test while incorrectly excluding them biases it in favour of 
the unit-root null hypothesis (Guilkey and Schmidt, 1991; Elder and Kennedy, 2001). 
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 First, while casualties depress presidential popularity in all three wars, the overall effect 
(captured in b3) is strongest for the Vietnam War, followed by the Korean War and the 
Iraq War. Moreover, the difference between the casualty effect in the Vietnam War and 
the other two conflicts is statistically significant at last at the 85% confidence level in 
all specifications (FVietnam,Korea equals 2.71, 3.12 and 2.22 in columns (1), (2) and (3) 
respectively [p<0.15]; FVietnam,Iraq is 5.44, 5.79 and 4.22 respectively [p<0.05]). The 
effect of casualties in Iraq and Korea is statistically indistinguishable (FKorea,Iraq is 0.41, 
0.37 and 0.28 respectively [p>0.50]). Given the difference in the (absolute) number of 
casualties in both wars (roughly 36000 in Korea versus 3000 in Iraq [up to 2006:3, the 
last observation in our analysis]), this suggests that the smaller (absolute) casualty 
counts in Iraq lead to the same public retribution than the higher counts during the 
Korean War. Potential explanations can be sought in the trauma of the Vietnam War 
(cf. Eichenberg et al., 2006), or in technological advances in warfare (making US 
citizens less inclined to accept human losses among their troops; see also Sapolsky and 
Shapiro, 1996).  
 Second, the onset of the war is not necessarily characterized by lower levels of casualty 
sensitivity. The interaction term between the number of casualties and the indicator 
variable for the onset of the war is positively signed – and statistically significant – only 
for the Korean and Iraq War. Yet, even in these cases, results should be carefully 
interpreted. For the Korean War, casualties have a negative effect even in the beginning 
of the conflict (i.e. b3k+b4k is negative)13, but this is insignificantly different from 0 in 
most specifications (F=0.74, 2.06 and 3.04 in columns (1), (2) and (3) respectively 
[p=0.39, 0.15 and 0.08]). Hence, the positive rally-effect manages to (near-completely) 
outweigh the negative casualties effect. For the Iraq War, the interaction term more than 
compensates the effect of casualties when defining the onset of the war as the first two 
and first three quarters, though this does not hold when regarding the first quarter only. 
This suggests that there was a rally-type effect, but that the good news in the second 
and third quarter of the war (i.e. the announcement of the successful conclusion of the 
conflict) had an important additional effect. In all cases, the casualty effect becomes 
insignificant (F=0.36, 1.46 and 0.07; p=0.55, 0.23 and 0.79 respectively for Columns 
(1), (2) and (3)). Finally, for the Vietnam War, the interaction effect is weakly negative, 
indicating that there was no counterbalancing effect in the early stages of that war. A 
possible explanation here is that US military strength and activity in Vietnam was 
building up before the US Congress gave official authorization via the declaration of 
Tonkin in August 1964 (though this official declaration clearly did not spur the 
population to ‘rally’ behind its leader). 
 Finally, the change in presidency during the Korean and Vietnam wars appears to have 
differently affected how casualties translate into popularity. In the Korean War, the 
change in presidency fully eliminated the negative effect of war casualties (in all three 
estimations b3k+b5k ≈ 0.29; F1, 191≈0.50; p>0.45). While Eisenhower thus seemed fully 
insulated from such losses, this was hardly the case for Nixon. Casualties suffered in the 
late stages of the Vietnam conflict still (albeit weakly) impinged on his popularity (in 
all three estimations: b3v+b5v≈ -0.75; F1, 191≈1.80; p≈0.17). Both findings indicate that 
inheriting a war insulates the incumbent from popular disapproval about military 
casualties, but only when the conflict is resolved shortly after. The Vietnam War lasted 
well after President Nixon came to power, such that he too became tainted by the 
human losses suffered in that conflict. 
 
                                                          
13  Parameters b3 and b4 refer to the model described at the beginning of section 3.1. Still, for clarity, we now 
add a subscript k, v and i for ‘Korea’, ‘Vietnam’ and ‘Iraq’ respectively. 
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Overall, our analysis of US presidential popularity over the period 1948-2006 illustrates that 
intensity (and occurrence) of casualty effects on presidential popularity varies significantly 
across the three considered military conflicts (i.e. Korea, Vietnam, Iraq). Moreover, although 
not the prime concern of the present (largely descriptive) analysis, these differences can be 
credibly linked to historical developments.  
 
4. Conclusion 
War casualties have been shown to significantly affect incumbent popularity. The present 
paper’s main contention is that the strength – and even occurrence – of such casualty effects is 
likely to depend on the economic, social or ideological context of the conflict. To illustrate 
this point, we provided a (largely descriptive) analysis of US president approval ratings over 
the period 1948-2006 (i.c. comparing the Korean, Vietnam and Iraq Wars). Specifically, we 
assessed whether wars involving the US tend to depress US presidential popularity depending 
on the number of casualties suffered and whether this effect is weaker in the early stages of 
the war or for presidents inheriting the war. Moreover, although not the main aim of the 
analysis, we also provide some intuitive – and of necessity preliminary – arguments that could 
help explain the observed differences, thereby paving the way for a more thorough assessment 
of the scope conditions under which they surface (cf. Lakatos, 1981; Elster, 1989).  
 
Our results indicate that casualty effects are present in different ways in the each of the three 
wars analysed. In fact, although casualties always have a negative effect on popularity, its 
overall effect is strongest in Vietnam, followed by the Korean and Iraq War. War casualties at 
the onset of the war tend to be less politically costly in Korea, but not in Vietnam. The 
findings for the Iraq War induce some caution about the interpretation of this effect (as it 
might partly pick up ‘good news’ during the period defined as the onset of the war). Finally, 
the change in presidency during the Korean War mitigated the effect of casualties on approval 
ratings to a greater extent than the change in presidency during the Vietnam War. Indeed, 
Eisenhower did not appear to suffer in terms of popularity for war casualties in the later stages 
of the Korean conflict, but Nixon clearly did after he inherited the Vietnam War. 
 
These results strongly support the view that the context, timing and sequence of events are 
crucially important in political and social processes (Pierson, 2000a, b). The effects of 
casualties on public opinion are in important (and intuitively comprehensible) ways linked to 
the context of the conflict. Nevertheless, further comparative research is required to get a 
tighter hold on which contextual influences matter, as well as how and why they influence 
casualty sensitivity across conflicts. 
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Table 1: Results from unit-root tests (using Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests) 
 
Variable # lags τμ Inference 
Presidential Approval b 1 -4.63*** Stationary 
Presidential Approval (log transformed) a 0 -4.18*** Stationary 
Growth b 11 -5.35*** Stationary 
Unemployment b 11 -2.55*** Stationary 
Inflation a 12 -1.22 Unit root 
Inflation, first differences a 11 -6.35*** Stationary 
Note:  Critical values τμ, are in Fuller (1976). We use interpolated critical values as provided by Stata. Inclusion 
of a drift parameter (or constant term) and time trend were based on statistical significance of these 
variables. Superscript a indicates the absence of both the constant term and a time trend while superscript 
b implies inclusion of a constant term only. 
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Table 2: Determinants of US Presidential approval ratings 1948-2006 
 
 (1) 
1 quarter 
(2) 
2 quarters 
(3) 
3 quarters 
Intercept 21.937 *** (5.22) 
23.794 *** 
(5.81) 
23.834 *** 
(5.60) 
Approval  
(lagged) 
0.734 *** 
(19.95) 
0.716 *** 
(20.40) 
0.715 *** 
(19.82) 
Growth 0.219 *** (2.76) 
0.219 *** 
(2.80) 
0.227 *** 
(2.91) 
Unemployment -1.287 *** (-3.67) 
-1.432 *** 
(-4.13) 
-1.429 *** 
(-3.94) 
Inflation 
(first difference) 
-0.594 
(-1.49) 
-0.644 * 
(-1.67) 
-0.742 
(-1.57) 
Honeymoon 0.429 (0.80) 
0.421 
(0.78) 
0.421 
(0.78) 
Election 2.232 *** (2.83) 
2.347 *** 
(2.89) 
2.268 *** 
(2.80) 
Divided Government 2.463 (1.62) 
2.223 
(1.47) 
2.259 
(1.47) 
Watergate -11.643 *** (-5.67) 
-11.915 *** 
(-6.06) 
-11.786 *** 
(-5.97) 
Iran-Contra -7.461 *** (-9.94) 
-7.467 *** 
(-10.01) 
-7.415 *** 
(-9.81) 
Lewinsky 2.532 ** (1.98) 
2.653 ** 
(2.11) 
2.636 ** 
(2.10) 
Korea casualties (log) -1.101 *** (-3.03) 
-1.274 *** 
(-3.55) 
-1.256 *** 
(-3.26) 
Korea casualties * 
WarStart 
0.854 *** 
(2.95) 
0.835 *** 
(3.43) 
0.584 
(1.51) 
Korea casualties (log) * 
NewAdmin 
1.439 *** 
(2.95) 
1.566 *** 
(3.24) 
1.556 *** 
(3.18) 
Vietnam casualties (log) -1.881 *** (-4.10) 
-2.118 *** 
(-4.65) 
-2.041 *** 
(-4.04) 
Vietnam casualties (log)* 
WarStart 
-0.210 
(-1.09) 
-0.357 
(-1.64) 
-0.100 
(-0.36) 
Vietnam casualties (log)* 
NewAdmin 
1.144 
(1.55) 
1.375 * 
(1.87) 
1.297 * 
(1.67) 
Iraq casualties (log) -0.805 ** (-2.07) 
-1.003 *** 
(-2.88) 
-1.013 *** 
(-2.83) 
Iraq casualties (log) * 
WarStart 
0.614 ** 
(2.38) 
1.828 *** 
(2.86) 
1.215 * 
(1.69) 
Gulfdum 24.061 *** (13.82) 
23.990 *** 
(13.82) 
23.990 *** 
(13.63) 
Iran hostage 8.617 * (1.92) 
8.271 * 
(1.84) 
8.330 * 
(1.84) 
9/11 26.410 *** (18.22) 
26.419 *** 
(17.94) 
26.317 *** 
(17.63) 
Administration dummies  
F (10, 191) 
YES 
3.62 *** 
YES 
4.28 *** 
YES 
3.88 *** 
Adj. R2 
AR(1) 
RESET³ 
Heteroscedasticity 
91.64 
0.03 
1.34 
1.77 
92.02 
0.01 
1.69 
1.52 
91.78 
0.03 
1.52 
1.70 
Note:  N = 223. Numbers between brackets are t-values. *** significant at 1%; ** at 5% and * at 10%. AR(1) is 
the Breusch-Godfrey test for first-order autocorrelation. RESET³ represents Ramsey’s (1969) test for 
functional form misspecification while ‘Heteroscedasticity’ shows the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroscedastic disturbances. 
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Appendix A: Summary statistics  
 
Table A1: Summary Statistics (N = 223) 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Presidential Approval 54.43 12.56 23.33 87.13 
Growth 3.48 4.08 -10.4 17.4 
Inflation 3.76 2.97 -2.79 14.43 
Unemployment 5.63 1.50 2.57 10.67 
Honeymoon 0.27 0.75 0 3 
Election 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Divided Government 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Watergate 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Iran-Contra 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Lewinsky 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Korea casualties (log) 0.54 1.91 0 8.87 
Vietnam casualties (log) 1.30 2.53 0 8.60 
Iraq casualties (log) 0.35 1.29 0 5.66 
Iran Hostage 0.01 0.08 0 1 
9/11 0.004 0.07 0 1 
  
  
